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I. INTRODUCTION
"Carelessness about our security is dangerous; carelessness about
our freedom is also dangerous. "' The obvious message of this statement is
to be ever-mindful of the fine line between a comfortable co-existence with
the government and a pronounced separation from the government.
Accordingly, decisions to support or oppose governmental action should
contemplate this cautious yet responsible approach. The abstraction of the
statement requires its individualized application to specific governmental
action to determine whether our decision to endorse or oppose that action is
prudent. One such governmental action is the FBI's implementation of
Carnivore, an Internet monitoring system introduced on July 11, 2000.2
Carnivore was designed, and is used exclusively, to carry out court-
ordered surveillance of electronic communications, e.g., e-mail.3 Carnivore
1. Adlai E. Stevenson Jr., Speech in Detroit, Michigan (October 7, 1952), in
DANIEL B. BAKER, POWER QUOTES 123 (1992).
2. The Carnivore FOIA Litigation, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/
(updated Aug. 8, 2001).
3. Carnivore can also be used to record Internet sites visited by the suspect for
later evaluation, but the FBI insists that usage of Carnivore is restricted to
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is a tangible, portable device, tantamount to a phone tap, that acts as a
"sniffer," allowing the FBI to intercept and collect criminal suspects' e-
mail without their knowledge or consent.4 Carnivore is used only in limited
circumstances-after FBI, Department of Justice, and judicial scrutiny-
pursuant to detailed court orders prescribing and proscribing retrieval
procedures. The concern that Carnivore transforms George Orwell's
fictitious "Big Brother" concept to reality (by allowing the FBI to engage
in unfettered e-mail monitoring), however, raises the need to address the
system.
Accordingly, this Note addresses competing and parallel interests
between the government and society to determine the legitimacy and
necessity of Carnivore. The purpose of this Note is twofold: first to
demonstrate the need for Carnivore to enable law enforcement to keep up
with criminals who utilize cyberspace to communicate criminal plans; and
second to dispel privacy concerns associated with the system by allaying
misconceptions and fears related to its implementation and usage.
Part Il of this Note addresses the catalyzing reasons for Carnivore's
design and use. Part II describes the FBI's extensive and mandatory
internal procedures that dictate the decision to use Carnivore to pursue a
suspected criminal, and addresses the three federal statutes that can
empower Carnivore's use. Part IV explains Carnivore's method of
operation; i.e., how it works in each of three stages. Part V articulates the
privacy concerns raised by privacy advocates, including: (1) the possibility
of collecting and storing e-mail in violation of federal law; (2) Fourth
Amendment infringement; and (3) a lack of FBI individual accountability
by failing to employ tracking mechanisms that allow for independent
oversight. Finally, this Note concludes by addressing policy considerations
that should shape the future for Carnivore.
II. A BACKGROUND TO CARNIVORE: REASONS FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
As computer technology and usage rapidly proliferates within our
society, criminals embrace this advancement by capitalizing on the
capturing e-mail transmission. See lT RESEARCH INST., INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF
THE CARNIVORE SYsTEM, FINAL REPORT §§ ES.4-5 (2000), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/camivoredraftl.pdf [hereinafter REVIEw].
4. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, Digital Privacy Act of
2000 and Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary: Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of
Donald Kerr, Assistant Director, FBI Laboratory) available at http:llwww.fbi.gov/
pressrm/congress/congress00/kerr09O600.htm [hereinafter 9/6/00 Hearing].
5. Id.
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opportunities and capabilities produced by that technology's increasing
6pervasiveness. The FBI recognizes cyberspace as an efficient and
increasingly popular medium for criminal activity, especially among spies,
hackers, and other dangerous criminals.7 In response to these threats against
the safety of the American people, to the security of our communications
infrastructure, and to the important commercial and private need for a safe,
secure, and vibrant Internet, the FBI has concentrated its technological
efforts and resources to fight a broad array of cyber crimes.8 One of these
efforts has been in the design and implementation of Carnivore, which the
FBI hopes will increase public safety by reducing the amount of computer-
assisted criminal activity. Specifically, the FBI has articulated five types of
critically important crimes that Carnivore will target: terrorism, information
warfare, child pornography, fraud (including white collar), and virus
writing and distribution.9
A. Terrorism
Terrorists use information technology and the Internet to formulate
plans, to raise funds, to spread propaganda, and to communicate securely.'0
Cyber terrorism-the usage of cyber tools to shut down critical national
infrastructures such as energy, transportation, water, telecommunications
and other government operations to coerce or intimidate a government or
civilian population-is a very real threat with destructive potential.' In
fact, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, testifying on the
worldwide threat of terrorism, stated that terrorist groups, including
Hizbollah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization, and Bin Laden's al
Qa'ida organization are using computerized files, e-mail, and encryption to
support their operations.12 Although none of these groups have successfully
6. Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Program:
Hearing Before the House Comm on the Judiciary: Internet and Data Interception
Capabilities Developed by the FBI, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Donald Kerr,
Assistant Director, FBI Laboratory), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/
congressO/kerr072400.htm [hereinafter 7/24/00 Hearing].
7. 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection: The Threat Is Real:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1999) (statement
of Michael Vatis, Director, FBI National Infrastructure Protection Center),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ congress/congress99/nipc10-6.htm.
11. Cyber Attack: Improving Prevention and Prosecution: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Guadalupe
Gonzalez, Special Agent In Charge, FBI Phoenix Field Division), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ congress/congressO0/gonzaO42100.htm.
12. Id.
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employed cyber technology to infiltrate our critical infrastructures, their
reliance on information technology and acquisition of computer expertise
clearly indicates the knowledge, opportunity, and interest for chaotic
destruction.1
3
While the danger from these organizations is currently only a
potential threat, the FBI has documented acts of terrorism that were
organized and conspired through e-mail and downloaded to computer
systems. The FBI, using traditional law enforcement tactics, recently
thwarted a terrorist group's plan to break into several National Guard
Armories and steal explosives to incapacitate several power transmission
sources in the southern United States.' 4 FBI intelligence revealed e-mail to
be a major communication method among the group in attempting to
effectuate their plan.15 Further, the FBI seized computer evidence that
showed the group had downloaded information on Ricin, the third most
deadly toxin in the world.'
6
B. Information Warfare
Quite possibly the single greatest cyber threat to our national security
lies in "information warfare" by foreign countries and their militaries
against U.S. critical infrastructures. 7 Information warfare is a product of
other countries' military inferiority in comparison to U.S. forces.' s In
essence, what foreign nations lack in firepower, resources, and training,
they attempt to compensate for by waging a "cyber war." This type of war
attempts to exploit our "Achilles heel"--a national dependence on
information technology in government, commercial, and private
• 19
operations.
Two Chinese military officers, cognizant of the United States'
military stronghold throughout the world, recently published a book that
recommended the usage of unconventional measures, including spreading
13. See id.
14. See 724/00 Hearing, supra note 6, at 33.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Jim Christy, Chasing Shadows: The Human Face Behind the Cyber
Threat, 53 F.C.L.J. 185 (2000) (reviewing RICHARD POWER, TANGLED WEB:
TALES OF DIGITAL CRIME FROM THE SHADOWS OF CYBERSPACE (2000)).
18. Cyber Attacks: Removing Roadblocks to Investigation and Information
Sharing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov't Info. of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Louis J. Freeh,
Director, FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress00/cyber
032800.htm [hereinafter 3128/00 Hearing].
19. Id.
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computer viruses to neutralize U.S. advantages. 0 Additionally, the Russian
government also recognizes that an attack on the U.S. computer
infrastructure, by its catastrophic consequences, could overlap with the use
of weapons of mass destruction.2'
C. Child Pornography
Although exploitation of children is not a national security issue like
terrorism and information warfare, its infiltration into our society is
analogously detrimental because it reaches deep into the welfare of our
communities. It is now overwhelmingly clear that computer and Internet
users are using their systems to disseminate child pornography, and to
arrange illegal meetings between user and child-an often violent and
22deadly combination. As a result, the Internet has dramatically increasedS • . 23
the access of sex offenders to the population they seek to victimize. These
manipulating users take on a "virtual" identity, appealing to a child's
impressionable mind while maintaining the saving grace of anonymity.
Once a relationship has been established, the trap has been set and the
predatory Internet user now must only coerce the innocent child to take the
already tempting bait.
To combat sexual predators, the FBI devised "Innocent Images," an
initiative designed to capture individuals who travel between states to
engage in illegal sexual activity with a child, and those who produce or
distribute child pornography via the Internet. 24 The program entails FBI
agents going undercover on the Internet by assuming the role of a child,
arranging a meeting place with an offender, and arresting the offender(s)
• 21
upon identification. Capturing these offenders is extremely difficult,
however, because the offenders can easily remain anonymous. They use
encryption to conceal their illegal activities, which usually consist of
26communicating with the child and storing pornography files. Innocent
Images found it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to defeat the
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See 7/24/00 Hearing, supra note 6.
23. Online Child Pornography, Innocent Images National Initiative, at http://
www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/cac/innocent.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002) [hereinafter
Innocent Images].
24. Preventing Child Exploitation on the Internet: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Senate Appropriations of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (1998) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI), available at http://
www.fbi.gov/congress/congress98/sac310.htm [hereinafter 3/10/98 Hearing].
25. Id.
26. Id.
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encryption.27
The FBI is extremely focused on and concerned with sexual predators
because they possess distinct character traits. In fact, clinical studies report
that a child molester will typically victimize seventy innocent children
during his or her lifetime.8 Between 1995 and 2001, the FBI investigated
over 800 cases involving offenders crossing state lines to carry out an
illegal sexual relationship and more than 1,850 cases involving the
exchange of child pornography over the Internet.29 All arrests pursuant to
these investigations were made using traditional enforcement tactics-
before the implementation of Carnivore.
D. Fraud
Internet fraud is defined as any fraudulent scheme in which one or
more components of the Internet, such as Web sites, chat rooms and E-
mail, play a significant role in offering nonexistent goods or services to
consumers, communicating false or fraudulent representations about
the schemes to consumers, or transmitting victims' funds, access
devices or other items of value to the control of the scheme's
perpetrators.
30
Understanding and using the Internet to combat Internet fraud is absolutely
essential for law enforcement.3'
The Internet provides an ideal medium to commit fraud for three
reasons. First, access to the Internet essentially means access to thousands
of other Internet users through chat rooms, forum discussions, and instant
messaging systems. Second, as with sexual predators, fraudsters can retain
complete anonymity.32 "The crucial difference in fraud committed over the
Internet is that the perpetrator can 'virtually' vanish, leaving consumers
wondering who or where to turn to for help. 33 Third, fraudsters no longer
face financial barriers such as mailings, hiring people to reply to the
mailings, and maintaining expensive toll-free telephone services.34
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4.
30. The Internet Fraud and Complaint Center, Bankruptcy Fraud Video, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/ifcc/about/aboutifcc.htm (last visited March 2,
2001) [hereinafter 1FCCQ.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Internet Fraud Complaint Center Press Packet (May 8, 2000), at http://www.
fbi.gov/pressrel/ pressrel00/ifccpr.htm.
34. 1FCC, supra note 30.
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The North American Securities Administrators Association estimates
Internet-related stock fraud costs investors approximately $10 billion per
year, which equals nearly $1 million per hour.35 In just one case, on March
5, 2000, nineteen fraudsters were indicted in conjunction with a multi-
million dollar insider trading scheme that used Internet Service Provider
("ISP") chat rooms as the medium to facilitate and effectuate their
scheme.36 The central "player" in the case passed inside information about
clients of several other brokerage firms to two other individuals in
exchange for a percentage of the profits subsequently received by acting on
the information.37 This fraudster passed information almost solely through
online chats and instant messages for two and one-half years, received
$170,000 in kickbacks for his services, and earned $500,000 for his
partners.38 Although the FBI captured these criminals, the traditional tactics
used to arrest the individuals involved were inefficient, and keeping up
with these types of criminals requires a different approach.39
E. Virus Writing
As computer usage increases, so does the number of computer
viruses. Throughout the U.S. and other cyber-linked countries, virus writers
pose an increasing risk to networks and systems.40 In the year 2000, viruses
such as the Melissa Macro Virus, the Explore.Zip worm, and the CIH
(Chernobyl) Virus infiltrated systems worldwide, destroying computer
programs and files.41 Many computer viruses use e-mail as the vehicle for
destruction, proliferating through the computer system when the user opens
the e-mail file.
35. 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4, at 34.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. IFCC, supra note 30.
40. 3/28/00 Hearing, supra note 18, at 27 (statement of Louis J. Freeh).
41. See id.
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I1. CARNIVORE USE MUST BE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL
STATUTE
Before Carnivore's surgical methods are employed to pursue a
suspected criminal, two safeguards fraught with substantive and
procedural requirements must be satisfied: The Bureau and
Department of Justice ("DOJ") must endorse its usage, and federal
law must permit its deployment.
A. FBI and DOJ Approval
Before Carnivore is engaged, the FBI must scrutinize its
42
appropriateness under the circumstances, and obtain DOJ approval. FBI
standard operating procedure mandates an eight-step process for
determining the appropriateness of Carnivore usage. First, the FBI field
agent assigned to the potential case involving Carnivore works in
collaboration with the field office principal legal advisor and an attorney
from the nearest U.S. Attorney's Office.43 Together, they revise their
documentation of the case's circumstances and particulars, and make
comments and suggestions to those involved in the next level of scrutiny.
44
After approval from field office management, the office submits the
case file to the Department of Justice's Office of Enforcement Operations
("DOJOEO") in the Criminal Division, and also to FBI Headquarters.45
Once received by Headquarters, the documents are processed and analyzed
by the Legal Counsel Division and the Criminal Investigative Division.46
Upon arrival at the Criminal Investigative Division, the case file is
appropriated to the program manager in charge of the crime(s) being
investigated, e.g., child pornography or terrorism. 47 This program manager
thoroughly reviews the case record and file, and determines if the suspect is
48
worthy of pursuit and if interception is appropriate. The interception
inquiry ends if the program manager makes a negative determination.
If the program manager decides the suspect and interception is
appropriate, the DOJOEO and Legal Counsel Division further refine case
42. Donald P. Delaney et al., Wiretap Laws and Procedures: What Happens
When the U.S. Government Taps a Line, § 2.1.1, at http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/
privacy/wiretap/wiretap.procedure.html (Sept. 23, 1993).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Delaney, supra note 42.
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findings and forward them to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General (or
someone higher).49 The Deputy Assistant Attorney General reviews the
documents and decides whether to approve the case's continuation.50 If
approved, the DOJ authorizes the initial U.S. Attorney's Office to complete
and file in court a final version of all documents acquired in conjunction
with the investigation."' This file includes documents necessary to analyze
the interception under federal guidelines (which will be discussed in the
following section). 2 After the case is filed, the U.S. Attorney's Office
applies for a court order to use Carnivore by submitting the suspect's file
and the DOJ authorization to a federal judge. 3 This judge then analyzes the
comprehensive record and rules and decides whether Carnivore's use
would comport with federal law. 4
B. Federal Statutory Approval
Even if Carnivore receives the requisite Bureau and DOJ
endorsement, its usage must still conform to federal law. The governing
federal law will be revealed in the application submitted to the federal
judge, but will be either: (1) Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title I1"); (2) the pen-trap provisions of 18
U.S.C. §§ 3121-3124; or (3) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act."
1. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968
Title III, as amended by the Electronic Privacy Communications Act
of 1986, governs all interception of electronic communications conducted
56by federal law enforcement investigators. Before Carnivore is granted
installation permission pursuant to a Title III investigation, the FBI must be
pursuing a recognized Title III suspect and usage of Carnivore must
comply with the Title ifi procedural requirements.
a. Subject Must be a Recognized Title III Suspect
To begin the Title III Carnivore inquiry, the FBI must be pursuing a
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Delaney, supra note 42.
55. REvIEw, supra note 3, § 3.1.
56. Electronic Privacy Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
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suspect believed to have committed a recognized crime under Title ITI 7
Title I exhaustively enumerates these crimes, which are limited to
felonies such as murder, kidnapping, child molestation, felony violations of
obscenity, crimes against national security, robbery, malicious mischief,
extortion, organized crime, and narcotics offenses. If the suspect is notpursued for violation of an enumerated crime, Carnivore cannot be utilized.
b. Case File and Judicial Order Must Satisfy the Act's
Requirements
If the subject is a statutorily recognized suspect, Title III still
mandates the satisfaction of two procedural requirements before a judge
can approve Carnivore's deployment. To satisfy the first requirement, the
FBI, in its application for an order, must specify and particularize: (1) facts
demonstrating probable cause that statutorily recognized offenses are being
committed; (2) a description of the nature and location of the facilities
where the communications will be intercepted; (3) a description of the
communications sought to be intercepted; and (4) the identity of the
suspect.59 Finally, the FBI must indicate that normal investigative
procedures have been insufficient to obtain the desired information, e.g.,• • 60
due to danger or technology restrictions.
If the first requirement is satisfied and the federal judge grants the
wiretap request, the judge's wiretap order must contain the following to
satisfy the second requirement: (1) the identity of the person whose
communication is to be intercepted; (2) the nature and location of the
communications facilities to which interception is granted; (3) a particular
description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted along
with a statement of the particular alleged offense; (4) the identity, and
authorizing officer, of the agency authorized to intercept the
communications; (5) the authorized time period for interception, 1 which62
cannot exceed thirty days and which should include "a statement as to
whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the
described communication has been first obtained;, 63 and (6) an order
requiring the FBI to minimize the interception of communications not
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
58. Id. § 2516(1).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1).
60. Delaney, supra note 42.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a)-(e).
62. Id. § 2518(5).
63. Id. § 2518(4)(e).
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authorized to be intercepted under part three of the order.64
2. Federal Pen-Trap Statute
The Federal Pen-Trap Statute provides a less intrusive mechanism for
wiretapping than its Title I counterpart, and allows law enforcement to
monitor e-mail in two ways: "trap-and-trace" monitoring and "pen-
register" monitoring (together, "pen-trap devices"). 65 Trap-and-trace e-mail
monitoring decrypts the identification of every account attempting to
communicate with the suspected felon, whereas pen-register e-mail
monitoring tracks all outbound communication from the suspected felon's
account. 6 Unlike Title III monitoring, pen-trap devices do not inquire into
the content of the communication, or substantively record
communication.6 7 Instead, the FBI uses the pen-trap statute to obtain
destination and origination information of incoming and outgoing e-mail
messages. Typically, an e-mail pen-register order will only authorize
collection of the source ("FROM field"), destination ("TO field"), date,
time, user account address, and duration of the message.6
Although a pen-trap device can only be deployed pursuant to a court
order, the information it can gather is inherently less intrusive than that
gathered under Title III. Accordingly, the requirements to obtain a pen-trap
• • 70
order are less stringent than for Title Ill wiretap interceptions.
Nevertheless, the pen-trap order authorizing collection of Carnivore-
monitored e-mail must specify the identity of the person with the e-mail
address, the identity of the person under investigation, and the offense for
which the person is under investigation.7' Further, the FBI is precluded
from inquiring delving into the e-mail's subject line and "re" information.
64. Id. § 2518(5).
65. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3124.
66. Robert Graham, Carnivore FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) § 3.1, at
http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/camivore-faq.html (Oct. 6, 2001).
67. 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4, at 37 (statement of Donald Kerr).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a). Notice that applications for the usage of pen-trap
devices may be made by any federal government attorney or state investigative or
law enforcement officer. Also, no special authorization is required. Id. § 3122. In
fact, any court fulfilling jurisdictional requirements is required to issue a pen-trap
order if the court finds that information expected to be obtained would be relevant
to an ongoing investigation. Id. § 3123(a).
71. See id. § 3123(b). Although the language of the statute does not explicitly
state that these procedures apply to electronic communication and no case law
exists to validate such an application, there have been no constitutional challenges
to the FBI's usage of pen-trap devices in such a manner.
72. 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4, at 37 (statement of Donald Kerr).
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Any law enforcement agent that uses a pen-trap device without first
acquiring a court order is subject to a fine and up to a year in prison.73
3. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) allows the federal
government to monitor electronic communication of foreign powers, and
agents of foreign powers located in the United States, to obtain foreign
intelligence information.74 If the focus of the surveillance is not a U.S.
citizen, no court order is required and only authorization from the Attorney
General is necessary.75 If the subject of surveillance is a U.S. citizen, the
usage of Carnivore must be approved through a special foreign intelligence
surveillance court that determines its appropriateness by using standards
analogous to those used to obtain permission under Title IH.
76
IV. METHOD OF OPERATION
Relative to the most technologically current computer hardware,
Carnivore is considered, by experts, to be systemically unsophisticated; the
computer program has been around since 1992.77 The system configuration
is comprised of: a four- to eighteen-gigabyte hard drive with 128-
megabytes of RAM; a Pentium Il processor; Windows NT or Windows
2000; and a two-gigabyte Jaz drive-all of which can be readily purchased
78
through a local computer retailer.
There are, however, fundamental differences between Carnivore and
the typical "off-the-shelf" system. First, the Carnivore computers exclude a
TCP/IP identifier, which virtually obviates the possibility of being hacked
into by a network user, and include "network isolation devices," which
prevent the computer from transmitting data in the unlikely event that
hackers hijack Carnivore's system.79 Secondly, the Carnivore computers
are equipped with a hardware authentication device, which prevents ISP
personnel or law enforcement agents from obtaining post-programming
access to the contents of the computer without producing visible signs of
forced entry.8 O
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(d).
74. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (1994).
75. Id. § 1802(a)(1).
76. See id. § 1805(b).
77. Graham, supra note 66, § 1.5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
A. Background of Internet Communication
Unlike telephones, which work through a circuit-switching process
that allocates one phone line for use between the two communicating
parties, the Internet delivers messages (e-mail) via a process known as
"packet switching."8' Packet switching refers to a transmission process in
which entire messages are divided into tiny packets of information before
they are sent.82 These packets consist of binary code-simply a numeric
stream of many "Os" and "ls" that will eventually be reorganized into a
readable message.8' After the packets are divided, they are transmitted
separately, and can follow one of thousands of different possible routes
before passing through an ISP and on to its desired destination. 84 After all
the packets forming the message arrive at the destination, they are
85recompiled into the original message.
B. Carnivore's Installation and Filtering: A Process of Stages
After the FBI receives judicial approval to initiate Carnivore's setup,
the physical deployment and information retrieval process begins.
Specifically, the process consists of four stages: installation, filtration,
segregation, and collection.
1. Stage One: Installing Carnivore
After the FBI has obtained an authorization to capture information
pursuant to one of the three previously mentioned statutes, they will turn to
the suspect's ISP to determine if the ISP has the technology to comply with
the court order." If the ISP can comply, Carnivore is not used. If the ISP
cannot, the FBI engages in a cooperative effort with the ISP technicians to
position Carnivore in the network where the suspect's communication
packets can be isolated.87
81. Webopedia, Packet Switching, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/
packet-switching.html (last modified May 1, 2001).
82. See id.
83. See 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4, at 37 (statement of Donald Kerr).
84. Marilyn McKinley Parrish, The Internet for Church Librarians, at
http://www.mph.org/plan/planspr96b.htm (April-June 1996).
85. Systemnews, Digital Journey, The Human Origins of the Internet, at http://
sun.systemnews.com/system-news/j obdir/submitted/2002.02/5154/5154.html
(last visited March 12, 2002).
86. 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4, at 37.
87. Id.
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2. Stage Two: Initial Filtering
Carnivore's first action is to "take a glimpse" of the ISP's traffic,
which includes traffic from non-targeted individuals, and filter the packets
of "Os" and "ls" at the ISP's designated speed, usually 40 mega-bits per
second or much higher."8 Carnivore filters this binary code in "real time,"
which means it processes at least 40 million "Os" and "ls" each second,
depending on the speed of the packets. 9 This initial filtration serves to
determine whether the suspect's identifying information, in accordance
with the court order, is present in the binary code.90 Carnivore essentially
takes a picture each second, searching for the suspect's information. If the
suspect's information is not present, every packet of information is
vaporized, and not collected, stored, or saved, and Carnivore analyzes the
next second's data.9' If the suspect's information is present, Carnivore
proceeds to Stage Three.92
3. Stage Three: Segregating the Suspect's Information
If Carnivore detects the suspect's identifying information, the packets
of the suspect's communication are segregated for additional filtration and
storage.9 3 This filtration and storage is effectuated entirely within the
Carnivore device, without known FBI or ISP technician interference.94
4. Stage Four: Following Collection Orders
After the Stage Two filtration and Stage Three segregation occurs, the
suspect's information is filtered again to comport with the court order.95
Carnivore checks its programming to see what it should filter and collect
for processing, as determined by court order, and discards nonretrievable
information.96 For example, Carnivore determines whether the collection is
for purposes of Title III, pen-trap collection, or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. Once again, this process is done entirely within
Carnivore, without known FBI or ISP technician interference.
97
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4, at 37.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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V. PRIVACY CONCERNS
Since its inception, Carnivore has been scrutinized as an over-
infringing device that "devours" the privacy rights of every non-targeted
individual whose information passes through the system. While activist
groups and individuals have verbally denounced Carnivore and have
established websites" to collaboratively oppose its use, the two most
prominent opponents are the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
and the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"). Many of their
concerns are technical in nature, rooted in Carnivore's general operation-
they want to know the system's capabilities, what goes on inside the "black
box," and whether the installation could expose or cause ISPs to
malfunction or crash.99
The DOJ recognized this widespread ignorance and distrust of the
system, and consequently contracted with the HT Research Institute and the
Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent School of Law ("ITRI") to
address the technical concerns of the system. °00 However, the IITRI
"expressly declined to address the significant legal issues surrounding the
use of the Carnivore system."'' 1 As a result, EPIC, the ACLU, and other
privacy advocates have articulated three continuing legal concerns: (1) the
possibility that Carnivore conducts broad sweeps over the ISP's
transmissions; (2) Carnivore's ability to transmit more than the suspect's
data violates the Fourth Amendment; (3) the lack of FBI personnel
accountability for Carnivore further creates a concern for over-collection
• • 102
through agent impropriety. Until these issues have been sufficiently
resolved, privacy advocates urge the FBI to suspend Carnivore
deployments. 13
A. Concern #1- Can Carnivore Spy on Every Internet User?
Many privacy advocates are concerned that Carnivore collects more
98. See, e.g., Stop Carnivore NOW!, at http://www.stopcamivore.org (last
visited Jan. 26, 2002).
99. Mario Figueroa, Carnivore-Diagnostic Tool or Invasion of Privacy?, at
http://rr.sans.org/legal/carnivore.php (Sept. 1, 2000).
100. REVIEW, supra note 3. The report analyzed the process assessment, system
architecture, software source code, and laboratory tests. See id. §§ 2-1, 2-3.
However, the nature of IITRI's findings enabled them to answer questions that
were not strictly technical. See id. § 4-9.
101. E-mail from David L. Sobel, General Counsel, EPIC, to Carnivore Review
Panel, U.S. Department of Justice, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivorel
reviewcomments.html (Dec. 1, 2000) [hereinafter EPIC Review].
102. See id.
103. Id.
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data than is allowed by court order. They fear that Carnivore can read the
content of all individuals' e-mails over an ISP.' 4 In fact, David Sobel,
General Counsel for EPIC, stated that Carnivore could easily conduct a
"broad sweep" of transmission data.1
05
If so programmed, the FBI concedes that Carnivore could conceivably
be able to collect and archive all unfiltered traffic from an extremely small
ISP.10 6 Such a notion will probably remain strictly theoretical, however,
because a court order would never allow for such a broad sweeping
collection, regardless of ISP size.'07 But even if a court granted such an
order, there is not a realistic possibility that such a sweep would occur
because of Carnivore's intrinsic storage limitations.
Carnivore does not have nearly enough power 'to spy on almost
everyone with an e-mail account.' In order to work effectively, it must
reject the majority of packets it monitors. It also monitors only the
packets traversing the wire to which it is connected. Typically, this
wire is a network segment handling only a subset of a particular ISP's
traffic.
108
However, withstanding intentional mis-programming, which will be
discussed in Part V.C., this issue is moot because a court would never
authorize such a broad sweep.
When programmed for a Title III or FISA collection, Carnivore
provides the FBI with no more information than is permitted by the court
order.19 In cases involving a pen-trap order, however, Carnivore does
collect "more than would be permitted by the strictest possible construction
of the pen-trap statute."" 0 The over-collected data is essentially useless to
the FBI. Instead of only collecting the contents from the 'TO" and
"FROM" fields, Carnivore also replaces characters in the other fields, for
example putting an "X" in the subject line."' Therefore, the FBI could
ascertain the length of the subject line by counting the number of "Xs."
Aside from these character replacements in pen-trap mode, "there was no
evidence of over-collection during any of the tests."
'
"
12
104. Stop Carnivore NOW!, at http://www.stopcarniovre.org/whatcan
carnivoredo.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
105. See EPIC Review, supra note 101.
106. Letter from Donald Kerr, Director, FBI, to Senator Patrick I. Leahy, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 23, 2001), available at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/camivore/kerrletter.html.
107. Id.
108. REVIEw, supra note 3, § ES.5.
109. Id. § 4.3•1.
110. Id. § 4.2.3.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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To further allay the concern of collecting more data than authorized,
Carnivore has been configured to "err on the side of caution." When
programmed in accordance with the court order that unequivocally
prescribes the programming, Carnivore provides investigators with less
information than can legally be obtained if a suspect's privacy right can be
potentially infringed.'13
B. Concern #2 - Is Carnivore Eating the Fourth Amendment?
Carnivore's purpose is to capture criminal suspects' Internet
transmissions, notwithstanding the suspects' knowledge or consent. That
purpose necessarily results in the clandestine acquisition of non-suspects'
electronically transmitted data. Consequently, many privacy advocates
question whether Carnivore comports with the Fourth Amendment when
processing both the non-suspects' data as well as the suspects' information.
1. Non-Suspects' Fourth Amendment Rights
EPIC and other privacy advocates claim that much of the controversy
surrounding Carnivore is derived from its ability to access and process a
great deal of ISP transmissions.' 4 This concept particularly concerns the
organization because users not named in the court order and not targeted by
the FBI have their transmissions processed through Carnivore."5 "It is this
unique aspect of Carnivore that gives rise to fundamental privacy risks,"
' 1
6
and creates a Fourth Amendment concern because the court order is a
warrant for collection of the suspect's data, not the non-targeted
individual's data.'"7
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the
public's privacy and security from arbitrary governmental invasion." 8
Accordingly, law enforcement must obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures by obtaining a warrant. " 9 While warrants are
preferred, there are certain undefined, limited circumstances that allow law
enforcement to conduct searches without probable cause or individualized
suspicion. 20 A government action falls within these limited circumstances
113. Id. § 4.3.1.
114. See EPIC Review, supra note 101.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. S. Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
119. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
120. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (citing Treasury Employees
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)).
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when the privacy interest implicated by the search is minimal, and the
action serves an important governmental interest that would not be
promoted if individualized suspicion of each non-targeted subject is
required.1
2 1
Assuming non-targeted individuals have a privacy expectation in their
packets of information, the standards for warrantless intrusions clearly
permit Carnivore's processing. Since Carnivore is used only to pursue
felons, the government obviously has an important interest in their
apprehension. Non-targeted suspects have only a minimal privacy interest
in their packets of information because each packet contains very little
information and the intrusion-a brief, one-second processing of data-is
negligible. If, however, the government opts to collect, store, and analyze a
non-targeted subject's information, there is a much lower governmental
interest because the non-targeted subject is not a criminal suspect, and there
exists an obvious increase in the degree of intrusiveness because the
packets are being analyzed. Thus, the evidence would be barred from usage
by the exclusionary rule. But so long as Carnivore only processes the
non-targeted subject's information, the system does not violate these non-
targeted subjects' Fourth Amendment rights.
2. Targeted Suspects' Fourth Amendment Rights
Privacy advocates also express concern for the suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights when Carnivore is used pursuant to a pen-trap order.
Since pen-trap devices are less intrusive than Title III interceptions,
acquiring a suspect's information does not require a showing of probable
cause. Thus, advocates argue the collection of the 'TO" and "FROM"
fields constitutes an unjustified search and seizure of the suspect's data. 24
This argument fails, however, because the Supreme Court has determined
that a suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information collected pursuant to a pen-trap order.1 2' Even if the suspect
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment challenge
would fail due to the same balancing test applied above for non-targeted
subjects: the governmental interest of solving the particular crime far
outweighs the minimal privacy interest the suspect has in the "TO" and
121. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
122. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
123. Stop Carnivore NOW!, Why Carnivore is Bad for You (Reason # 1), at
http://stopcamivore.org/whyitsbad/reasonl.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
124. Id.
125. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979). Although this case
addressed telephonic interception, the same reasoning can be applied to e-mails
because essentially the same information is obtained.
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"FROM" fields.
C. Concern #3 - Who's Spying on the Spiers?
The purpose of Carnivore is to process ISP transmissions in strict
adherence to the empowering court order, which allows gathering and
storing the suspect's data, but mandates instantaneous purging of a non-
suspect's data. Theoretically, this gathering and purging is effectuated after
the Carnivore box is programmed in exact accordance with the court order.
Since theory is not reality, privacy advocates worry that Carnivore is
susceptible to programming in violation of the court order. 26 This is
possible because Carnivore lacks "audit functions," which results in the
absence of an individual user accountability mechanism.
2 1
Auditing is crucial in security. It is the means by which users are held
accountable for their actions. There is no auditing in Carnivore. The
Carnivore version 1.3.4 collection computer is always logged in as the
"Administrator" rather than using individual user IDs. This
Administrator log-in means that every user of the system has full
control over all the resources of the system... Since everyone with
Administrator access has full control, there is nothing to prevent
someone from using a Hex editor or other tool to [access Carnivore's
advanced filter setting menu]. Therefore, it is not possible to determine
who, among a group of agents with the password, may have set or
changed filter settings.1
28
This deficiency is Carnivore's most troubling attribute. Without
individual user accountability, there exists no system-intrinsic disincentive
for FBI agents to unlawfully program Carnivore. A simple click of a mouse
(whether intentional or unintentional) changes Carnivore's configuration
settings from a pen-trap collection to a full collection under Title IT' 9
"There is no mechanism for detecting or minimizing the likelihood of such
an unintentional setup error."'
30
The implementation of an auditing system would almost certainly
reduce both intentional and unintentional violations; it may cause a
potentially unintentional violator to more carefully select the proper setting,
and may cause a corrupt FBI agent to abate intentions of mis-programming.
126. See EPIC Review, supra note 101.
127. REVIEW, supra note 3, § 4-9.
128. Id. § 4.2.4.
129. Id. § 4.3.3. There is also the possibility of improperly setting Carnivore to
comply with the court order. Ide However, this "chance of error.., is low because
of the large number of individuals involved in framing the court order and
determining the feasibility of its implementation by Carnivore." Id.
130. Id.
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Nevertheless, until an auditing system is implemented, mis-
programming can occur, resulting in collection of more data than allowed
by the court order.13 ' Although this excessively collected data may be
subject to judicial suppression, privacy advocates could claim the mis-
programming infringed on the subject's privacy right and the possibility
remains of unlawfully initiating an investigation based on information
learned as a result of the over-collection. It is natural to assume that privacy
advocates would be unwilling to rely on the FBI's assurance that any
information inadvertently gathered beyond the scope of the court order is
disposed of in conformity with federal statutory and constitutional law.
Quite simply, there need to be safeguarding mechanisms in place to
counteract Carnivore's systematic pitfalls. Fortunately, federal statutes and
rules exist that not only protect subjects who have fallen victim to over-
collection, but also deter intentional and unintentional mis-programming.
1. Title III and FISA Post-Collection Judicial Review
3 2
Both Title Ill and FISA provide for judicial oversight when Carnivore
is used. Specifically, Title III mandates the recording of the contents of the
electronic communication intercepted by Carnivore.33  Further,
"[i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, ... such
recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and
sealed under his directions.' 34
FISA provides similar oversight language when the subject is a
United States citizen, but adopts a judicially permissive, though not
mandatory, review. 35 The statute provides in relevant portion:
At or before the end of the period of time for which electronic
surveillance is approved by an order ... the judge may assess
compliance with the minimization procedures by reviewing the
circumstances under which information concerning United States
persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.
36
Thus, each Title III and FISA order-issuing judge has the opportunity
to compare the captured information with the court order to independently
determine the legality of the obtained information, and accordingly
131. Id.
132. As stated, the FBI receives less information when Carnivore is configured
for a pen-trap collection than for a Title III or FISA collection. Therefore, mis-
programming from a Title II or FISA collection to a pen-trap collection seems
highly unlikely because more information is retrievable by following the court
order.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a).
134. Id.
135. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(3).
136. Id.
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suppress all deemed "over-collection."
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 901
Evidence must be authenticated to be admissible against a defendant
at trial."' "[This] requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims." '138 To comport with section 901, Carnivore appends to an event file
for each collection in which the filter configuration is used. 1 9 This
information makes explicit to the FBI, judge, and jury what mode
controlled Carnivore's use during the collection process and what it was
programmed to collect. 40 Since over-collection of the suspect's
transmissions would violate the court order and the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights, the trial judge could apply the exclusionary rule to
suppress illegally seized information.14
3. Criminal and Civil Liability; Employment Termination
Any FBI agent that engages in the illegal, unauthorized conduct of
electronic surveillance commits a federal criminal offense punishable by
imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both. 42 In addition, an
individual victimized by unlawful over-collection or interception can
recover damages in a civil action including punitive damages, as well as
attorney's fees and other costs against the person or entity engaged in the• -- 143
violation. Although the culpable FBI agent may not be personally liable
for damages, the impending disciplinary action for causing the government
liability certainly serves as a deterrent. In fact, every law enforcement agent
who illegally conducts electronic surveillance is subject to immediate
termination.'"
VI. CONCLUSION
Internet technology has evolved exponentially over the past few
years, and the future will certainly continue to realize the same growth. The
accessibility to such an immense audience, coupled with a criminal's ease
137. FED. R. Evm. 901.
138. Id.
139. 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4.
140. Id.
141. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383.
142. 50 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a).
143. Id. § 2520.
144. 9/6/00 Hearing, supra note 4.
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of anonymity, requires an approach to accommodate the growing threats
made possible by the Internet.145 Carnivore represents a permissible and
responsible approach. It enables law enforcement to take one small step to
level a playing field currently dominated by criminals who can routinely
break the law by using an extremely evasive and criminally propitious
medium.
We live in a world where criminals can remain undetected or vanish
with the mere click of a mouse. Terrorists, whether foreign or U.S. citizens,
are undoubtedly plotting to bomb more American structures with the intent
of producing results like those witnessed on September llth or in
Oklahoma City. Pedophiles are pursuing and encroaching on innocent
children every day by assuming the most clandestine identities to
manipulate the child's every unsuspecting move. The governments of
foreign countries are deploying intelligence teams to crack the computer
codes that harbor our most important resources-such as our electrical and
water supplies, gas and oil reserves, and telecommunications-to exploit
our vulnerabilities and to potentially cause catastrophic and deadly results.
College students are writing computer viruses solely for the thrill of
destroying others' computer files. Although these hypothetical situations
seem disconnected in nature, they all share a commonality-the use of
electronic communication to facilitate their collusive, maniacal acts of
depravity.
The government inevitably faces a "Catch 22" when deciding how to
address these types of cyber criminals. If it uses investigative and surgical
methods such as Carnivore, privacy advocates criticize the action as overly
invasive of privacy rights. If it fails to pursue every avenue to eliminate
potential threats, advocates for crime control criticize the lack of action as
irresponsible policing and a failure to serve the interests of societal welfare.
Unfortunately, no governmental action will ever be uniformly supported.
Therefore, the government should initiate only those programs that adhere
to the statement offered in this Note's first sentence-act in the interests of
security while maintaining the utmost possible level of freedom. Carnivore
successfully furthers this goal by increasing security while not
compromising freedom.
The manner in which Carnivore collects transmissions is abstractly
analogous to a law-enforcement roadblock, instituted to search for an
escaped convict, that stops every vehicle (packet) traveling down a certain
road (ISP). If law enforcement is not 100 percent certain the traveler is the
convict (targeted suspect), the traveler is processed through the roadblock
145. IFCC, supra note 30.
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(Carnivore) and continues to the intended destination. If law enforcement is
100 percent certain, however, the traveler is detained. Privacy concerns are
alleviated when considering this entire electronic "roadblock" is
nondiscretionary in that decisions are made within the confines of the
acutely accurate Carnivore system, and not by a human police officer, who,
even if the paradigm example of objectivity, is still fraught with fallibility.
This is not to say Carnivore is perfect. Its lack of individual
accountability, as well as the potential to accidentally mis-program the
device, are flaws that should be remedied. As technology-based crime
increases, however, so does society's need to embrace governmental action
aimed at safeguarding society from this increased threat facilitated through
electronic communication.
With FBI and DOJ internal policy to bureaucratically determine
whether Carnivore should be used; Title II, Pen-trap, and FISA statutory
prescriptions; judicial oversight coupled with federal rules to deter
unlawful electronic communication interception; and continued necessary
pressure from privacy advocates, Carnivore is an appropriate, prudent, and
necessary law enforcement mechanism that balances the values of freedom
and security that predicate and underlie this Note.
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